Sept 18: Oil & Imperial Continuity

1920s & 1930s, Saudi Arabia

Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop (Intro & Chapter 1)

Robert Vitalis, Black Gold, White Crude

David Painter, Oil and the American Century

For anyone thinking of doing a reading response this week, let me add that you should be sure to cover at least two of the readings, and ideally all three if you can fit them together without it seeming forced. Let me know if there are other questions.

And, as per our conversation last week, the appendix on why Arabs hate the French. Many of the points you all brought up in class.

Arab Feeling Toward the French: Apart from the questions of process and recency, the anti-French feeling does seem to be deep-rooted in a large proportion of the Syrian population. This appears in an examination of the principal reasons given by the Syrians for their opposition to all French interference in their affairs. They say:

1. The French are enemies of religion, having none at home, and supporting Roman Catholics abroad for purely political motives.
2. They disapprove of the French attitude toward women.
3. The French education is superficial and inferior in character-building to the Anglo-Saxon. It leads to familiarity with that kind of French literature which is irreligious and immoral. The Moslems recognize that the time has come for the education of their women, and they say that those who receive French education tend to become uncontrollable.
4. The French have not treated the natives as equals in Algeria and Tunisia but have imposed differences in office holding and in various civil rights. This argument was presented very often and developed in some detail.
5. The French have shown a marked tendency to give an undue proportion of offices, concessions, and the like, to the Christians of Syria. Non-Catholics complain that the same discrimination is shown in favor of Catholics and Maronites.
6. By this discrimination, and by various intrigues since the occupation, the French have increased the religious divisions in Syria, which had been reduced greatly during the war. They thus endanger the possibility of Syrian nationalism on a non-religious basis.
7. The French are inclined to a policy of colonization, by which they wish to substitute the use of the French language for native tongues, and make the people into Frenchmen. The Syrians wish to preserve the use of the Arabic language, and to retain their separateness. Furthermore, it is inherent in this policy that the French would never leave Syria
8. The French have lost so many men in the war that they are unable to give needful protection or adequate administration. This is illustrated by the few soldiers and the inferior type of French officers and officials now in Syria. (Friends of the French deny that-France lacks good officials, and blame the French foreign office for choosing badly those who are sent out. Again, while for the English the Eastern service is a career and draws the best of the young men (for the French it seems a kind of exile and the best prefer to remain at home). It was affirmed that bribery and intrigue are worse in the French area now than under the Turks.
9. The French have suffered financially in the war to such an extent that they have not the means to restore France itself or to develop what possessions they have already. They cannot therefore give Syria the financial and economic support she needs.
10. The French are inclined toward financial exploitation of subject areas, and would govern Syria not for its own development, but for the profit of Frenchmen